In this comment we point out that the 'quantum dialogue' (Phys. Lett. A (in press)) can be eavesdropped under the intercept-and-resend attack. We also give a revised control mode to detect this attack. 
attack, the intercept-and-resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack. In this comment, we show this protocol is insecure under the intercept-and-resend attack and we give a revised protocol to detect this attack at the same time.
In Nguyen's protocol [1] , Bob first produces a large enough number of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (| ↓ h | ↑ t + | ↑ h | ↓ t , where h stands for "home", t for "travel" while | ↓ and | ↑ characterize two degrees of freedom of a qubit. Bob encodes his bits (k n , l n ) (k n , l n ∈ {0, 1}) by applying an operation C kn,ln on the state |Ψ 0,0 ht , keeps one qubit (home qubit) with him and sends another (travel qubit) to Alice. Then Bob lets Alice know that. Alice confirms Bob that she received a qubit. Alice encodes her bits (i n , j n ) (i n , j n ∈ {0, 1})
by performing an operation C in,jn on this travel qubit, then sends it back to Bob. When Bob receives this encoded travel qubit he performs a Bell basis measurement on this qubit pair and waits for Alice to tell him that was a run in message mode (MM) or in control mode (CM). In MM run, Bob decode Alice's bits and announces his Bell basis measurement result (x n , y n ) to let Alice decode his bits. In CM run, Alice reveals her encoding value to Bob to check the security of their dialogue.
However this security checking can not detect Eve's intercept-and-resend attack. Let us suppose
Eve prepares a number of EPR pairs in one of the four Bell states. Then Eve intercepts the travel qubit which has encoded Bob's bits (k n , l n ) and replaces it with a qubit in her prepared EPR pair.
She sends this fake travel qubit to Alice and retains another with her. Although Alice confirms
Bob that she received a qubit, she can not distinguish this qubit whether it is the original qubit or the fake qubit. Alice encodes her bits (i n , j n ) on this fake qubit and sends it back to Bob.
Then Eve intercepts this encoded fake qubit and performs a Bell basis measurement on it and the retained qubit. Since Eve knows the state of her prepared EPR pair, she can conclude Alice's bits (i n , j n ) and the encoding operation C in,jn . And then Eve performs a same operation as Alice on the original travel qubit and sends it back to Bob. Consequently, if it is a MM run, after
Bob announces publicly his Bell basis measurement result (x n , y n ), Eve can deduce Bob's bits:
Hence, in the MM run, Eve eavesdrops completely the contents of the Bob and Alice's dialogue. Actually, Eve replaces Alice to perform the encoding operation C in,jn on the travel qubit , as a result, when Alice publicly reveals the value (i n , j n ) for Bob to check eavesdropping, both i n = |x n − k n | and j n = |y n − l n | still hold. Accordingly, in the CM run the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, can not detect this intercept-and-resend eavesdropping.
Now we give a revised control mode (RCM) to detect this intercept-and-resend eavesdropping.
At first, we define the four Bell states as follows.
At the beginning, Bob prepares some EPR pairs in the state |Ψ 0,0 . Suppose that
Bob encodes his bits (k n , l n ) on the EPR pair |Ψ 0,0 by performing an operation C kn,ln on one qubit. Then Bob sends one qubit to Alice (travel qubit) and keeps another with him (home qubit).
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